Abstract. In this paper we study secure information flow policies in the sense of Meadows [12] and others for aggregated datasets, collectively. We first present a method for combining different sensitivity levels over a common dataset and investigate its ramifications on information flow policies. Next, safe-flow policies are formulated in full generality using domain-theoretic tools, and systematically derived as closure operators from Scott continuous functions. Maximum safeflow policies correspond to the top element of the lattice of the derived closureoperator collection. We then introduce a categorical framework for information flow, in which amalgamation is used to formulate and characterize informationflow policy merging. Our methods for mediating information flow policies should be of practical interest for information sharing among multiple agencies. Our formulation of safeflow policies as closure operators from Scott continuous functions and its associated categorical formulation of safe-flow policy merging provide a sound and general theoretical foundation for the first time for this topic, setting a stage for further development in this area.
Introduction
A possible way for determining a person's identity is to use a combination of data items such as the last four digits of SSN, zip code, date of birth, etc. Although each of the individual data items is relatively safe to be given away, the aggregated data set can lead to "identity theft". The culprit is the so-called functional dependence: the combined information uniquely identifies a person, and hence all other information about the person. If we assign a sensitivity level to each individual data item, the data aggregate problem [2] refers to the phenomenon that even though each individual data item has a low sensitivity level, their aggregate -the collection of these data items considered together, may entail a higher sensitivity level.
Translated to order-theoretic terms, this means that the sensitivity level function is usually a monotonic, but non-linear function, i.e., sups (or lattice sum, union) in the lattice of aggregated data sets need not be preserved by the sensitivity level function. Fig. 1 , the sensitivity level of {x, y}, "top secret" (TS), is strictly higher than those of {x} and {y}, "secret" (S). Although sensitivity levels are often finite structures in practical settings, one could use natural numbers N, real numbers R, and even other structures such as R × R to model sensitivity levels (to be consistent with the rest of the development, top and bottom elements should be added in these cases; also see Theorem 5) . This would be helpful when finer distinctions are to be captured by many sensitivity levels, but finiteness of the total number of sensitivity levels does not add anything. Instead, not requiring finiteness may open up connections with and offer insights from other mathematical structures which are normally not restricted to the finite cases.
Business companies sometimes deal with the data-aggregate phenomenon on an ad hoc basis by incorporating time sensitive information. For example, in addition to the routine identity related information items, some also request time-sensitive information such as "most recent transaction" as an added safety measure, This reenforces the intuition that aggregated data has a higher sensitivity level, and the access of the additional, implicit information is an indicator for someone with the privilege to access information at an even higher sensitivity level.
Safe information flow for aggregated data sets and the corresponding security policies have not been addressed in the past in a general order-theoretic framework. In this paper we study secure information flow policies in the sense of Meadows [12] , Millen [13] , and Kent [10] for aggregated datasets, collectively:
-we present a method for combining different sensitivity levels over a common dataset and investigate its ramifications in information flow policies; -we exam safe-flow policies using domain-theoretic methods to achieve a view of "information flow as reverse entailment". Safe-flow policies are systematically derived as a closure operator from a Scott continuous function and maximum safeflow policies correspond to the top element of the lattice of the derived closureoperator collection; -we introduce a categorical framework for information flow, in which amalgamation is used to formulate and characterize information-flow policy merging.
Our work reveals additional insights and added dimensions over the existing body of knowledge on information flow for aggregated data sets. Our results represent the first steps of an expansion of security research to the unexplored but important area of combining security policies for sharing and collaboration among agencies.
Lattices
We first recall some basic definitions of order theory and lattices to fix notation. Our main reference is [7] . A partially ordered set (poset) is a set P with a reflexive, symmetric, transitive relation ≤⊆ P × P. If (P, ≤) is a poset, then its dual is the poset (P, ≥). We denote posets by their carrier set as long as the partial order is irrelevant or clear from the context.
dcpo). L is a complete lattice if every subset S ⊆ L has a least upper bound S and a greatest lower bound (infimum, meet) S .
Functions between partially ordered sets are the basic mechanism relating one poset to another.
Definition 2. Consider posets D and E, and a function f : D → E. Then f is monotone if it preserves the order of D, i.e. whenever x ≤ y in D, one finds f
(x) ≤ f (y) in E.
Moreover, f is called Scott continuous if for any (directed) S ⊆ D such that S exists, one finds that f (S )
Note that preservation of directed suprema (infima) always entails monotonicity, since every pair of elements x ≤ y induces a directed set {x, y} for which preservation of suprema (infima) implies f (x) ≤ f (y) as required. 
Lemma 1 is folklore; we provide a concise and direct proof.
Proof. Let C be a collection of closure operators on L. We first show that the operator C, defined as ( C)(x) := c∈C c(x) for each x ∈ L, is again a closure operator. The required monotonicity and inflationary properties are obvious. To show idempotency, we need
Since for each c i in C we have
the ≤ direction holds. For the ≥ direction, note that since each c i is inflationary, we have
This shows that arbitrary meet exists for the set of all closure operators on L. Since the closure operator that maps everything to top is the largest operator, the join of a set of operators can be obtained as the meet of all closure operators above them.
Information Flow for Finite Sets
In order to set a proper stage for our work, we first briefly review secure information flow policies for finite sets which motivated much of the development of this work. This will provide both the intuition and the appreciation of the significance of the developments to follow.
It is natural to consider aggregated data sets to be comprised of primitive data items, and any combination of those data items are possible. Thus the data space can be taken to be a power set lattice of the form 2 X , where X is the set of primitive data items. In the security literature, X is assumed to be finite. This turns out to be an unnecessary restriction. However, it makes sense to consider information flow between finite data sets only, which are compact elements in the algebraic lattice (2 X , ⊆). With respect to security of access policies, if a data set is enlarged, the sensitivity level should not decrease. Therefore the sensitivity level function must be a monotonic function. As pointed out earlier, however, such a function cannot be assumed linear, in the sense that the sensitivity level of a data set cannot be required to be equal to the least upper bound of those of its individual parts. This is sometimes referred to as the "aggregation problem". Meadows proved in 1990 a theorem about information flow in aggregates, which we will refer to as the "Maxmum Safe-Flow Theorem" [12, 13] . We briefly recall Meadows' result in this section, reformulating it with a more ordertheoretic flavor in preparation for a more general formulation in the next section.
Definition 4. A dataset aggregate system is a triple
where X is a finite collection of "datasets", L is a lattice of sensitivity levels, and λ : 2 X → L is a monotone function assigning a lattice element (ordinarily a sensitivity level) to each collection of datasets.
The rationale for choosing a lattice structure for sensitivity levels appeared first in [2] . Meadows' result concerns information flow policies. We introduce a regrouping of the properties in the definitions of flow policy and safe flow policy so that a flow policy is monotonic, transitive, and aggregative, leaving the maintenance of sensitivity levels as the sole signature for safety. This way, flow policies are a certain kind of closure operators. Since we are most interested in safe flow policies, this adjustment allows us to clearly delineate and focus on the property essential to safety.
Definition 5. [Flow Policy] An operator
c : 2 X → 2 X
is a flow policy if it is a closure operator.
In contrast, Meadows' flow policy is a transitive relation R ⊆ 2 X × 2 X , written in infix form as → R , that extends set inclusion on sets of datasets. That is, for all u, v ⊆ X, R is a transitive relation on 2 X , and
A flow policy is safe if it respects the order on sensitivity levels.
Definition 6. [Safe Flow Policy] A safe flow policy is a closure operator c : 2
X → 2 X that respects sensitivity levels, i.e., for any x, y ⊆ X,
It should be helpful again to recall Meadows' safe flow policy, with safety defined in terms of two independent conditions, i.e.:
1. it respects the sensitivity level mapping:
The idea behind Meadows' safe flow policy is that if u → R v, then information is permitted to flow from u to v: a subject with a sufficiently high access-level to read v will also have sufficient access-level to read u. If both u and v can flow to w, then their combined information can be aggregated in w, so w must be assigned a high enough aggregated level. The intent is to make sure that when flows are permitted, the destination data object is labeled a high enough sensitivity level to protect information in the aggregated content.
Meadows' formulation has the advantage that it is intuitive, and our new formulation has the advantage that it is conceptually more elegant and easier to generalize. In the next section we present a generalized formulation of safe flow policies and show (in Theorem 2) that the two formulations are equivalent in the setting of powersets (equivalence in full generality does not apply, because Meadows' formulation hinges upon powersets).
An important result is Meadows' Maximal Safe-Flow Theorem, which states that there exists a unique maximal safe flow policy and gives a characterization of it (see Theorem 2.5, [12] ). The following result appears in [13] and uses Meadows' formulation of safe flow policy. It is quoted here to set the background for our more general maximal safe-flow result (Theorem 3, item 3).
Theorem 1. [Maximal Safe-Flow Theorem] Let (X, L, λ) be a dataset aggregate system, and let R be the flow policy defined by
u → R v ⇐⇒ ∀w ⊆ X, λ(u ∪ w) ≤ λ(v ∪ w).
Then R is the unique maximal safe flow policy.
This result is conceptually important. It says that there always exists a flow policy that permits maximal information flow, and it is the only one determined by the property that aggregation with any additional data item does not violate the constraint imposed by sensitivity level. A consequence of this result is that the maximal safe flow policy is determined by flows from single elements (Lemma 2.6, [12] ).
General Dataset Aggregate Systems
In this section we provide a general formulation of the data aggregate problem and recast Meadows proof as a universal closure operator derived from a Scott continuous function. Since closure operators are intimately related to logical entailment [14] [15] [16] [17] , this allows us to conceptually view information flow as reverse entailment.
Definition 7. A general dataset aggregate system (GDAS) is a Scott continuous function λ : D → L, where D and L are complete lattices.
There seems to be nothing special with GDASs merely from this definition; the distinction comes from new aspects we explore next in the direction of flow policies.
First, we look for an appropriate formulation of a safe flow policy (see Definition 6) in GDASs.
is a closure operator c that respects sensitivity levels, i.e., for any x, y ∈ D,
This additional property will be referred to as the safety condition.
We illustrate how this definition relates to the definitions for finite powersets given in the previous section. Proof. 1. Suppose → R is a safe flow policy in the sense of Meadows. Then
X . Since R is aggregative and X is finite, we obtain c R (x) → R x. Now by the above, y → R x follows from transitivity and we have shown that y ∈ {z | z → R x}. So c R (c R (x)) ⊆ c R (x) and c R is a closure operator.
Suppose x ⊆ c R (y). As noted before, we have c R (y) → R y. Therefore, x → R y, by monotonicity and transitivity of R. Being a safe flow policy in the sense of Meadows, R respects sensitivity levels. Therefore, λ(x) ≤ λ(y). 
We also have R =→ c R , because for any x, y ⊆ X,
where the second last step follows from the fact that R is an aggregative relation and X is a finite set, and the last step follows from transitivity and monotonicity of R.
Lemma 1 tells us that the set of all closure operators on a complete lattices again forms a complete lattice; but it does not inform us about the order-theoretic property of safe flow policies. Now we can follow Definition 8 in studying safe flow policies, thanks to Theorem 2. We show that the collection of safe flow policies forms a complete lattice as well. As a first step, we establish the existence of the top element, generalizing Meadows' Maximal Safe-Flow Theorem (Thm. 1). Proof. (1) . The set in question is clearly non-empty. Let
Then for any z ∈ D, we have
(2). Item (1) establishes ( ) * as a well-defined operator. It is clearly inflationary and monotonic. To show that it is idempotent, it suffices to show that λ((x)
In particular, this shows that λ((x)
* , where ( ) * is the safe flow policy established in (2) . By the definition of ( ) * , it suffices to show that for every z ∈ D, λ(c(x) ∨ z) ≤ λ(x ∨ z). This is true by noting c(x) ∨ z ≤ c(x ∨ z) and applying Definition 8.
Since in finite lattices any monotonic function is Scott continuous, Meadow's (Theorem 2.5, [12]) result can be seen as a corollary of Theorem 3 by letting D = 2 X and u → R v if and only if u ⊆ (v)
* . Note that the continuity of λ is critical for Theorem 3 to be valid for general D.
The upshot of Theorem 3 is that by letting v ⊢ u if and only if u ⊆ (v) * , one can readily check that ⊢ is reflexive, transitive, and monotonic, satisfying the axioms of information systems in the sense of Scott [14, 17] , and hence is an entailment relation. It is in this sense that we say information flow (→) is the reverse of entailment (⊢), taking continuous functions as the generators.
Since safe flow policies are closure operators, the meet C of an arbitrary set of safe flow policies C with respect to a GDAS λ : D → L is again a closure operator, according to Lemma 1. Suppose for some x, y ∈ D, x ≤ ( C)(y). Then x ≤ c(y) for each c ∈ C. If C is not empty, then λ(x) ≤ λ(y) sine c is a safe flow policy. If C is empty, then by convention C = ( ) * and we still have λ(x) ≤ λ(y). Hence C is a safe flow policy. We have in effect proved the following.
Proposition 1. The set of all safe flow policies with respect to a GDAS λ : D → L is a complete lattice.

Definition 9. An element c in a dcpo D is called compact if for every directed set S ⊆ D, c ≤ S implies c ≤ s for some s ∈ S . The set of all compact elements of D will be denoted by K(D). A complete lattice L is an algebraic lattice, if for every element x ∈ L, we have x = (↓ x ∩ K(L)).
Compactness and algebraicity are important notations capturing how infinite information content can be approximated systematically by pieces of finite information content. In a complete lattice
A typical example of algebraic lattices is the powerset lattice 2 X , i.e. the complete lattice of all subsets of X under inclusion. Finite subsets of X are precisely the compact elements in this case. 
Proposition 2. Suppose λ : D → L is a GDAS. Let
On the other hand, for any x, z ∈ D we have c(x) ∨ z ≤ c(x ∨ z) by the monotonicity of c. Therefore, c(c(x) ∨ z) ≤ c(x ∨ z) because c is idempotent. This implies that c(x) ∈ {y | ∀z ∈ D. c(y ∨ z) ≤ c(x ∨ z)}, and so
Thus (x) * = c(x) for any x ∈ D, as required.
Mediating Sensitivity Levels
When it comes to multiple agencies sharing data, the issue of information flow policy becomes more complicated. Different agencies may assign different sensitivity levels to common data sets, even assuming the same sensitivity level sets are used. Different agencies may share some data items but may also keep some to themselves. For a concrete toy example, consider two agencies A and B who assign slightly different sensitivity levels to shared data items {x, y, z}. Suppose agency A's assignment is as given in Fig. 1, and Then c 1 ∧ c 2 is a safe flow policy with respect to both λ ∧ and λ ∨ , where
The significance of this result is that when sensitivity levels are combined by taking either pointwise join or pointwise meet, a safe flow policy can be obtained by taking the intersection of safe flow policies of the components (considered as operators as facilitated by Theorem 2).
Proof. Note that by Lemma 1, the meet c 1 ∧ c 2 is a closure operator and so all we need to check is safety. We need to show that for any
Since both c 1 and c 2 are safe, and x ≤ c 1 (y) and x ≤ c 2 (y), we have λ 1 (x) ≤ λ 1 (y) and λ 2 (x) ≤ λ 2 (y). Hence the required inequalities follow easily.
However, there is no guarantee that the resulting policy permits maximal information flow (which can be considered as secondary in comparison to safety) when those permitting maximal information flows for each component are combined this way. For example, suppose ( ) * 1 and ( ) * 2 are maximal information flow policies for λ 1 and λ 2 , respectively. Then we only have
using the continuity of ∧ and the fact that
Although the other direction of the inequality (as needed to show maximal flow) does not hold in general, it is possible to preserve maximal information flow by modifying the domain of sensitivity levels, as shown in the next result. 
(≤). Suppose, by the continuity of ∧ (one can easily check by following definitions that ∧ is always continuous in each of its arguments), y 1 ∧ y 2 is such that λ 1 (y 1 
Theorem 5 confirms that maximal safe flow policy can be obtained from those of the component systems. The cost is in using a modified sensitivity value domain, which may not be desirable, depending on applications.
Merging Information Flow Policies as Amalgamation
In the previous section we looked into the issue of mediating sensitivity levels from different GDASs with the same datasets. In this section we study information flow policies among GDASs where both the datasets and the sensitivity level maps may differ. We provide a categorical formulation for information flow policies using slices [11] and employ Droste-Göbel's amalgamation [3, 4] techniques for domains for merging GDASs.
Similar to previous sections, all our results below directly translate to the traditional finite powerset setting which will not be explicitly restated. 
(L ↓ L) is a suitable setting for discussing GDASs because the objects of this category are GDASs with a fixed sensitivity domain L.
Proposition 4. Suppose the function h in the diagram of Definition 10 is onto and respects ∨. Then for any x
Proof.
We briefly introduce some terminologies before moving to merging information flow policies. Readers should refer to [3, 4] for closely related notions. 
With this in mind, we will keep the notation for meet polymorphic.
The proof for the next proposition is straightforward. The next result shows that safe flow policies for a larger data collection restrict to ones for sub-collections, if the coverage condition in Definition 11 is satisfied. Proof. Without loss of generality assume f to be an inclusion (identity). Let c E be a safe flow policy with respect to λ :
Proposition 6. Let the diagram
as required. Therefore c D is a flow policy. For safety, suppose x ≤ c D (y) for some x, y ∈ D. This means x ≤ g(c E (y)) ≤ c E (y). Since c E is safe, we have λ(x) ≤ λ(y).
We now consider the merging of GDASs with a common sensitivity domain. The notion of merging is important in a variety of settings, since it provides a basis for a disciplined way for sharing data, as well as an algorithmic foundation for implementation. In ontological engineering, this important topic has been addressed as the categorical construction of pushout by a number of researchers, e.g. Goguen [8] , Hitzler et al. [9] , and Kent [10] .
It makes sense to also consider formulating the merging of GDASs as a pushout in the category (L ↓ L). However, the sensitivity level mapping is an independent parameter from the underlying data structures, and it cannot be uniquely determined, as needed by the universality property that comes with the pushout construction. For this reason, we settle with the next best thing, i.e., merging as amalgamation.
Amalgamation has been studied extensively by Droste and Göbel for the existence and construction of universal domains in the theory of programming languages [3, 4] following the idea of the model-theoreitc result of Fraissé-Jósson [6] . Most recently, amalgamation has been shown to be a useful conceptual tool for the existence of certain causal sets in discrete space-time quantum gravity [5] .
Amalgamation is essentially pushout without necessarily the uniqueness of the merged structure. It is an explicit construction that guarantees that the underlying data structures are merged in the most conserved manner as possible, leaving room only for the additional decorations that are somewhat external to the data structure and cannot be uniquely determined. Note that our definition slightly differs from those given in [3, 4] ; Droste and Göbel consider a more general amalgam construction for arbitrary posets. However, the related proofs are similar and hence omitted.
Proposition 7 ([4], Lemma 4.4(c)).
In L, the amalgam of E 1 , E 2 over D is a complete lattice.
Theorem 6 ([4], Lemma 4.4(a)). Let F be the amalgam of E
With these preparations, we are ready to state the main result of this section with respect to the merging of GDASs in the slice category (L ↓ L). Proof. (Sketch) The key content of the proof resides in Theorem 6, which guarantees the existence of F. We check the existence for the required sensitivity level map η :
Theorem 7. Let the commutative diagram
The monotonicity of η follows from those of λ, λ i , i = 1, 2 and the fact that D E i F for i = 1, 2. For continuity, note that for any directed set T ⊆ E 1 ∪ E 2 , if T ∈ E 1 \ E 2 then t ∈ E 1 \ E 2 for some t ∈ T . Otherwise, T ⊆ E 2 , which implies T ∈ E 2 . This is a contradiction (in effect, E 1 \ E 2 and E 2 \ E 1 behave as Scott open). Then T ⊆ E 1 and η(T ) = λ 1 (T ).
The case for ⊤ F ∈ T is straightforward, since we have T = ⊤ F .
With this, we can call η : F → L an amalgamation of λ 1 : E 1 → L and λ 2 : E 2 → L over λ : D → L, in the category (L ↓ L) of GDASs. Remark 1. For x to occur in neither of the three cases (I), (II), and (III) in the definition for η, x must be the top element ⊤ F . We can also let η(⊤ F ) := ⊤ L , which can be different from λ 1 (⊤ E 1 ) ∨ L λ 2 (⊤ E 2 ). This is the reason why amalgamation for GDASs may not be uniquely determined up to isomorphism, one of the reasons to favor amalgamation over pushout. Note that letting η(⊤ F ) := ⊤ L amounts to the most conservative amalgamation, since it assigns the highest security level to the top element. The value λ 1 (⊤ E 1 ) ∨ L λ 2 (⊤ E 2 ) we used is the least conservative, because it is the lowest possible security class that one can assign to ⊤ F . It would be interesting to consider more general settings than Theorem 7, as well as the associated most conservative and least conservative merged GDASs. Then for η, there are two possibilities: η 1 (⊤) = U, or η 2 (⊤) = C, both serving as the candidate structure for the desired pushout construct but there does not exist a mediating map between these two choices.
Remark 3. If we restrict the lattices to those which are approximable by finite lattices, then the subslice of (L ↓ L) is ω-algebroidal [4] and therefore contains a universal (and homogeneous) object. However, the significance of such an object for security policy studies is unclear.
